seccomp: Move copy_seccomp() to no failure path.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2218682

commit a1140cb215fa13dcec06d12ba0c3ee105633b7c4
Author: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Date:   Tue Aug 23 08:45:32 2022 -0700

    seccomp: Move copy_seccomp() to no failure path.

    Our syzbot instance reported memory leaks in do_seccomp() [0], similar
    to the report [1].  It shows that we miss freeing struct seccomp_filter
    and some objects included in it.

    We can reproduce the issue with the program below [2] which calls one
    seccomp() and two clone() syscalls.

    The first clone()d child exits earlier than its parent and sends a
    signal to kill it during the second clone(), more precisely before the
    fatal_signal_pending() test in copy_process().  When the parent receives
    the signal, it has to destroy the embryonic process and return -EINTR to
    user space.  In the failure path, we have to call seccomp_filter_release()
    to decrement the filter's refcount.

    Initially, we called it in free_task() called from the failure path, but
    the commit 3a15fb6ed9 ("seccomp: release filter after task is fully
    dead") moved it to release_task() to notify user space as early as possible
    that the filter is no longer used.

    To keep the change and current seccomp refcount semantics, let's move
    copy_seccomp() just after the signal check and add a WARN_ON_ONCE() in
    free_task() for future debugging.

    [0]:
    unreferenced object 0xffff8880063add00 (size 256):
      comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.914s)
      hex dump (first 32 bytes):
        01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
        ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ................
      backtrace:
        do_seccomp (./include/linux/slab.h:600 ./include/linux/slab.h:733 kernel/seccomp.c:666 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
        do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
    unreferenced object 0xffffc90000035000 (size 4096):
      comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
      hex dump (first 32 bytes):
        01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 00 00  ................
        00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
      backtrace:
        __vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3226)
        __vmalloc_node (mm/vmalloc.c:3261 (discriminator 4))
        bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats (kernel/bpf/core.c:91)
        bpf_prog_alloc (kernel/bpf/core.c:129)
        bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1414)
        do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
        do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
    unreferenced object 0xffff888003fa1000 (size 1024):
      comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
      hex dump (first 32 bytes):
        00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
        00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
      backtrace:
        bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats (./include/linux/slab.h:600 ./include/linux/slab.h:733 kernel/bpf/core.c:95)
        bpf_prog_alloc (kernel/bpf/core.c:129)
        bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1414)
        do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
        do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
    unreferenced object 0xffff888006360240 (size 16):
      comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
      hex dump (first 16 bytes):
        01 00 37 00 76 65 72 6c e0 83 01 06 80 88 ff ff  ..7.verl........
      backtrace:
        bpf_prog_store_orig_filter (net/core/filter.c:1137)
        bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1428)
        do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
        do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
    unreferenced object 0xffff8880060183e0 (size 8):
      comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
      hex dump (first 8 bytes):
        06 00 00 00 00 00 ff 7f                          ........
      backtrace:
        kmemdup (mm/util.c:129)
        bpf_prog_store_orig_filter (net/core/filter.c:1144)
        bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1428)
        do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
        do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)

    [1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=2809bb0ac77ad9aa3f4afe42d6a610aba594a987

    [2]:
    #define _GNU_SOURCE
    #include <sched.h>
    #include <signal.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <sys/syscall.h>
    #include <linux/filter.h>
    #include <linux/seccomp.h>

    void main(void)
    {
            struct sock_filter filter[] = {
                    BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
            };
            struct sock_fprog fprog = {
                    .len = sizeof(filter) / sizeof(filter[0]),
                    .filter = filter,
            };
            long i, pid;

            syscall(__NR_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &fprog);

            for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
                    pid = syscall(__NR_clone, CLONE_NEWNET | SIGKILL, NULL, NULL, 0);
                    if (pid == 0)
                            return;
            }
    }

    Fixes: 3a15fb6ed9 ("seccomp: release filter after task is fully dead")
    Reported-by: syzbot+ab17848fe269b573eb71@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
    Reported-by: Ayushman Dutta <ayudutta@amazon.com>
    Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
    Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
    Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220823154532.82913-1-kuniyu@amazon.com

Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Malik 2023-07-11 13:39:56 +02:00
parent 35970745f2
commit eedd4d3960
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: AF7A2E1F6EE74FB3
1 changed files with 11 additions and 6 deletions

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@ -537,6 +537,9 @@ void put_task_stack(struct task_struct *tsk)
void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
WARN_ON_ONCE(tsk->seccomp.filter);
#endif
release_user_cpus_ptr(tsk);
scs_release(tsk);
@ -2390,12 +2393,6 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
spin_lock(&current->sighand->siglock);
/*
* Copy seccomp details explicitly here, in case they were changed
* before holding sighand lock.
*/
copy_seccomp(p);
rv_task_fork(p);
rseq_fork(p, clone_flags);
@ -2412,6 +2409,14 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
goto bad_fork_cancel_cgroup;
}
/* No more failure paths after this point. */
/*
* Copy seccomp details explicitly here, in case they were changed
* before holding sighand lock.
*/
copy_seccomp(p);
init_task_pid_links(p);
if (likely(p->pid)) {
ptrace_init_task(p, (clone_flags & CLONE_PTRACE) || trace);