Ubuntu-focal-kernel/include/linux/prandom.h

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random32: move the pseudo-random 32-bit definitions to prandom.h BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1891064 commit c0842fbc1b18c7a044e6ff3e8fa78bfa822c7d1a upstream. The addition of percpu.h to the list of includes in random.h revealed some circular dependencies on arm64 and possibly other platforms. This include was added solely for the pseudo-random definitions, which have nothing to do with the rest of the definitions in this file but are still there for legacy reasons. This patch moves the pseudo-random parts to linux/prandom.h and the percpu.h include with it, which is now guarded by _LINUX_PRANDOM_H and protected against recursive inclusion. A further cleanup step would be to remove this from <linux/random.h> entirely, and make people who use the prandom infrastructure include just the new header file. That's a bit of a churn patch, but grepping for "prandom_" and "next_pseudo_random32" "struct rnd_state" should catch most users. But it turns out that that nice cleanup step is fairly painful, because a _lot_ of code currently seems to depend on the implicit include of <linux/random.h>, which can currently come in a lot of ways, including such fairly core headfers as <linux/net.h>. So the "nice cleanup" part may or may never happen. Fixes: 1c9df907da83 ("random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h") Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ian May <ian.may@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kelsey Skunberg <kelsey.skunberg@canonical.com>
2020-07-31 05:51:14 +00:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* include/linux/prandom.h
*
* Include file for the fast pseudo-random 32-bit
* generation.
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_PRANDOM_H
#define _LINUX_PRANDOM_H
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/siphash.h>
random32: move the pseudo-random 32-bit definitions to prandom.h BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1891064 commit c0842fbc1b18c7a044e6ff3e8fa78bfa822c7d1a upstream. The addition of percpu.h to the list of includes in random.h revealed some circular dependencies on arm64 and possibly other platforms. This include was added solely for the pseudo-random definitions, which have nothing to do with the rest of the definitions in this file but are still there for legacy reasons. This patch moves the pseudo-random parts to linux/prandom.h and the percpu.h include with it, which is now guarded by _LINUX_PRANDOM_H and protected against recursive inclusion. A further cleanup step would be to remove this from <linux/random.h> entirely, and make people who use the prandom infrastructure include just the new header file. That's a bit of a churn patch, but grepping for "prandom_" and "next_pseudo_random32" "struct rnd_state" should catch most users. But it turns out that that nice cleanup step is fairly painful, because a _lot_ of code currently seems to depend on the implicit include of <linux/random.h>, which can currently come in a lot of ways, including such fairly core headfers as <linux/net.h>. So the "nice cleanup" part may or may never happen. Fixes: 1c9df907da83 ("random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h") Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ian May <ian.may@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kelsey Skunberg <kelsey.skunberg@canonical.com>
2020-07-31 05:51:14 +00:00
u32 prandom_u32(void);
void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
void prandom_reseed_late(void);
random32: add noise from network and scheduling activity With the removal of the interrupt perturbations in previous random32 change (random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable), the PRNG has become 100% deterministic again. While SipHash is expected to be way more robust against brute force than the previous Tausworthe LFSR, there's still the risk that whoever has even one temporary access to the PRNG's internal state is able to predict all subsequent draws till the next reseed (roughly every minute). This may happen through a side channel attack or any data leak. This patch restores the spirit of commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") in that it will perturb the internal PRNG's statee using externally collected noise, except that it will not pick that noise from the random pool's bits nor upon interrupt, but will rather combine a few elements along the Tx path that are collectively hard to predict, such as dev, skb and txq pointers, packet length and jiffies values. These ones are combined using a single round of SipHash into a single long variable that is mixed with the net_rand_state upon each invocation. The operation was inlined because it produces very small and efficient code, typically 3 xor, 2 add and 2 rol. The performance was measured to be the same (even very slightly better) than before the switch to SipHash; on a 6-core 12-thread Core i7-8700k equipped with a 40G NIC (i40e), the connection rate dropped from 556k/s to 555k/s while the SYN cookie rate grew from 5.38 Mpps to 5.45 Mpps. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/ Cc: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org> Cc: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: tytso@mit.edu Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> CVE-2023-0597 (backported from commit 3744741adab6d9195551ce30e65e726c7a408421) [cengizcan: prandom_u32_max returns 0 without this commit] [cengizcan: adjust header context in net/core/dev.c] Signed-off-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Acked-by: Roxana Nicolescu <roxana.nicolescu@canonical.com> Acked-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
2023-09-03 23:45:00 +00:00
DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
#define PRANDOM_ADD_NOISE(a, b, c, d) \
prandom_u32_add_noise((unsigned long)(a), (unsigned long)(b), \
(unsigned long)(c), (unsigned long)(d))
random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1905618 commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream. Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm, given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits. It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable. Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops. This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security; attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted. Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix. Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it is an open question. Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces it. Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: tytso@mit.edu Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@gmail.com> Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/ [ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal; inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4 members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> [wt: backported to 5.4 -- no tracepoint there] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
2020-08-09 06:57:44 +00:00
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
/*
* The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
* parallel given enough CPU resources.
*/
#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1905618 commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream. Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm, given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits. It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable. Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops. This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security; attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted. Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix. Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it is an open question. Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces it. Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: tytso@mit.edu Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@gmail.com> Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/ [ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal; inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4 members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> [wt: backported to 5.4 -- no tracepoint there] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
2020-08-09 06:57:44 +00:00
#define PRND_K0 (SIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_2)
#define PRND_K1 (SIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_3)
random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1905618 commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream. Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm, given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits. It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable. Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops. This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security; attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted. Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix. Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it is an open question. Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces it. Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: tytso@mit.edu Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@gmail.com> Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/ [ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal; inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4 members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> [wt: backported to 5.4 -- no tracepoint there] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
2020-08-09 06:57:44 +00:00
#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
/*
* On 32-bit machines, we use HSipHash, a reduced-width version of SipHash.
* This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
* applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
*/
#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define PRND_K0 (HSIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_2)
#define PRND_K1 (HSIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_3)
random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1905618 commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream. Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm, given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits. It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable. Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops. This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security; attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted. Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix. Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it is an open question. Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces it. Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: tytso@mit.edu Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@gmail.com> Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/ [ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal; inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4 members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> [wt: backported to 5.4 -- no tracepoint there] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
2020-08-09 06:57:44 +00:00
#else
#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
#endif
random32: add noise from network and scheduling activity With the removal of the interrupt perturbations in previous random32 change (random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable), the PRNG has become 100% deterministic again. While SipHash is expected to be way more robust against brute force than the previous Tausworthe LFSR, there's still the risk that whoever has even one temporary access to the PRNG's internal state is able to predict all subsequent draws till the next reseed (roughly every minute). This may happen through a side channel attack or any data leak. This patch restores the spirit of commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") in that it will perturb the internal PRNG's statee using externally collected noise, except that it will not pick that noise from the random pool's bits nor upon interrupt, but will rather combine a few elements along the Tx path that are collectively hard to predict, such as dev, skb and txq pointers, packet length and jiffies values. These ones are combined using a single round of SipHash into a single long variable that is mixed with the net_rand_state upon each invocation. The operation was inlined because it produces very small and efficient code, typically 3 xor, 2 add and 2 rol. The performance was measured to be the same (even very slightly better) than before the switch to SipHash; on a 6-core 12-thread Core i7-8700k equipped with a 40G NIC (i40e), the connection rate dropped from 556k/s to 555k/s while the SYN cookie rate grew from 5.38 Mpps to 5.45 Mpps. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/ Cc: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org> Cc: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: tytso@mit.edu Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> CVE-2023-0597 (backported from commit 3744741adab6d9195551ce30e65e726c7a408421) [cengizcan: prandom_u32_max returns 0 without this commit] [cengizcan: adjust header context in net/core/dev.c] Signed-off-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Acked-by: Roxana Nicolescu <roxana.nicolescu@canonical.com> Acked-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
2023-09-03 23:45:00 +00:00
static inline void prandom_u32_add_noise(unsigned long a, unsigned long b,
unsigned long c, unsigned long d)
{
/*
* This is not used cryptographically; it's just
* a convenient 4-word hash function. (3 xor, 2 add, 2 rol)
*/
a ^= raw_cpu_read(net_rand_noise);
PRND_SIPROUND(a, b, c, d);
raw_cpu_write(net_rand_noise, d);
}
random32: move the pseudo-random 32-bit definitions to prandom.h BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1891064 commit c0842fbc1b18c7a044e6ff3e8fa78bfa822c7d1a upstream. The addition of percpu.h to the list of includes in random.h revealed some circular dependencies on arm64 and possibly other platforms. This include was added solely for the pseudo-random definitions, which have nothing to do with the rest of the definitions in this file but are still there for legacy reasons. This patch moves the pseudo-random parts to linux/prandom.h and the percpu.h include with it, which is now guarded by _LINUX_PRANDOM_H and protected against recursive inclusion. A further cleanup step would be to remove this from <linux/random.h> entirely, and make people who use the prandom infrastructure include just the new header file. That's a bit of a churn patch, but grepping for "prandom_" and "next_pseudo_random32" "struct rnd_state" should catch most users. But it turns out that that nice cleanup step is fairly painful, because a _lot_ of code currently seems to depend on the implicit include of <linux/random.h>, which can currently come in a lot of ways, including such fairly core headfers as <linux/net.h>. So the "nice cleanup" part may or may never happen. Fixes: 1c9df907da83 ("random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h") Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ian May <ian.may@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kelsey Skunberg <kelsey.skunberg@canonical.com>
2020-07-31 05:51:14 +00:00
struct rnd_state {
__u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
};
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t nbytes);
void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state);
#define prandom_init_once(pcpu_state) \
DO_ONCE(prandom_seed_full_state, (pcpu_state))
/**
* prandom_u32_max - returns a pseudo-random number in interval [0, ep_ro)
* @ep_ro: right open interval endpoint
*
* Returns a pseudo-random number that is in interval [0, ep_ro). Note
* that the result depends on PRNG being well distributed in [0, ~0U]
* u32 space. Here we use maximally equidistributed combined Tausworthe
* generator, that is, prandom_u32(). This is useful when requesting a
* random index of an array containing ep_ro elements, for example.
*
* Returns: pseudo-random number in interval [0, ep_ro)
*/
static inline u32 prandom_u32_max(u32 ep_ro)
{
return (u32)(((u64) prandom_u32() * ep_ro) >> 32);
}
/*
* Handle minimum values for seeds
*/
static inline u32 __seed(u32 x, u32 m)
{
return (x < m) ? x + m : x;
}
/**
* prandom_seed_state - set seed for prandom_u32_state().
* @state: pointer to state structure to receive the seed.
* @seed: arbitrary 64-bit value to use as a seed.
*/
static inline void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed)
{
u32 i = ((seed >> 32) ^ (seed << 10) ^ seed) & 0xffffffffUL;
random32: move the pseudo-random 32-bit definitions to prandom.h BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1891064 commit c0842fbc1b18c7a044e6ff3e8fa78bfa822c7d1a upstream. The addition of percpu.h to the list of includes in random.h revealed some circular dependencies on arm64 and possibly other platforms. This include was added solely for the pseudo-random definitions, which have nothing to do with the rest of the definitions in this file but are still there for legacy reasons. This patch moves the pseudo-random parts to linux/prandom.h and the percpu.h include with it, which is now guarded by _LINUX_PRANDOM_H and protected against recursive inclusion. A further cleanup step would be to remove this from <linux/random.h> entirely, and make people who use the prandom infrastructure include just the new header file. That's a bit of a churn patch, but grepping for "prandom_" and "next_pseudo_random32" "struct rnd_state" should catch most users. But it turns out that that nice cleanup step is fairly painful, because a _lot_ of code currently seems to depend on the implicit include of <linux/random.h>, which can currently come in a lot of ways, including such fairly core headfers as <linux/net.h>. So the "nice cleanup" part may or may never happen. Fixes: 1c9df907da83 ("random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h") Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ian May <ian.may@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kelsey Skunberg <kelsey.skunberg@canonical.com>
2020-07-31 05:51:14 +00:00
state->s1 = __seed(i, 2U);
state->s2 = __seed(i, 8U);
state->s3 = __seed(i, 16U);
state->s4 = __seed(i, 128U);
random32: add noise from network and scheduling activity With the removal of the interrupt perturbations in previous random32 change (random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable), the PRNG has become 100% deterministic again. While SipHash is expected to be way more robust against brute force than the previous Tausworthe LFSR, there's still the risk that whoever has even one temporary access to the PRNG's internal state is able to predict all subsequent draws till the next reseed (roughly every minute). This may happen through a side channel attack or any data leak. This patch restores the spirit of commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") in that it will perturb the internal PRNG's statee using externally collected noise, except that it will not pick that noise from the random pool's bits nor upon interrupt, but will rather combine a few elements along the Tx path that are collectively hard to predict, such as dev, skb and txq pointers, packet length and jiffies values. These ones are combined using a single round of SipHash into a single long variable that is mixed with the net_rand_state upon each invocation. The operation was inlined because it produces very small and efficient code, typically 3 xor, 2 add and 2 rol. The performance was measured to be the same (even very slightly better) than before the switch to SipHash; on a 6-core 12-thread Core i7-8700k equipped with a 40G NIC (i40e), the connection rate dropped from 556k/s to 555k/s while the SYN cookie rate grew from 5.38 Mpps to 5.45 Mpps. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/ Cc: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org> Cc: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: tytso@mit.edu Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> CVE-2023-0597 (backported from commit 3744741adab6d9195551ce30e65e726c7a408421) [cengizcan: prandom_u32_max returns 0 without this commit] [cengizcan: adjust header context in net/core/dev.c] Signed-off-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Acked-by: Roxana Nicolescu <roxana.nicolescu@canonical.com> Acked-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
2023-09-03 23:45:00 +00:00
PRANDOM_ADD_NOISE(state, i, 0, 0);
random32: move the pseudo-random 32-bit definitions to prandom.h BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1891064 commit c0842fbc1b18c7a044e6ff3e8fa78bfa822c7d1a upstream. The addition of percpu.h to the list of includes in random.h revealed some circular dependencies on arm64 and possibly other platforms. This include was added solely for the pseudo-random definitions, which have nothing to do with the rest of the definitions in this file but are still there for legacy reasons. This patch moves the pseudo-random parts to linux/prandom.h and the percpu.h include with it, which is now guarded by _LINUX_PRANDOM_H and protected against recursive inclusion. A further cleanup step would be to remove this from <linux/random.h> entirely, and make people who use the prandom infrastructure include just the new header file. That's a bit of a churn patch, but grepping for "prandom_" and "next_pseudo_random32" "struct rnd_state" should catch most users. But it turns out that that nice cleanup step is fairly painful, because a _lot_ of code currently seems to depend on the implicit include of <linux/random.h>, which can currently come in a lot of ways, including such fairly core headfers as <linux/net.h>. So the "nice cleanup" part may or may never happen. Fixes: 1c9df907da83 ("random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h") Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ian May <ian.may@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kelsey Skunberg <kelsey.skunberg@canonical.com>
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}
/* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */
static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32(u32 seed)
{
return seed * 1664525 + 1013904223;
}
#endif