prlimit: do_prlimit needs to have a speculation check
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2008946 commit 739790605705ddcf18f21782b9c99ad7d53a8c11 upstream. do_prlimit() adds the user-controlled resource value to a pointer that will subsequently be dereferenced. In order to help prevent this codepath from being used as a spectre "gadget" a barrier needs to be added after checking the range. Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Tested-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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@ -1549,6 +1549,8 @@ int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
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if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
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return -EINVAL;
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resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
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if (new_rlim) {
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if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max)
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return -EINVAL;
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